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THE WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT: 
CONSUMER CREDIT SALES, CONSUMER 
LEASES, OPEN-END CREDIT PLANS, AND 
EXCLUSIONS 
RALPH C. ANZIVINO* 
The Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA) is a complex statute with very 
significant sanctions for creditors that fail to comply with its requirements.  
Debtors’ attorneys seek to claim that a transaction is subject to the WCA’s 
mandates, and of course, creditors’ attorneys seek to deny coverage.  This 
Article addresses the coverage issue by focusing on the three consumer 
credit transactions that are expressly subject to WCA coverage, and on the 
two most common transactions excluded from WCA coverage.  The three 
transactions expressly subject to WCA coverage are consumer sales, 
consumer leases, and open-ended credit plans.  Each distinct transaction 
has its own unique interpretation issues that will determine WCA 
coverage of the transaction depending upon the court's interpretation of 
the transaction.  The two most common exclusions under the WCA are 
consumer credit transactions that exceed $25,000, and the first lien real 
estate mortgage.  There are actually three different transactions that 
qualify under the $25,000 exclusion and each one is separately identified 
and explained.  Finally, the first lien real estate mortgage exclusion is 
analyzed with particular attention focused on identifying those types of 
interests that qualify as an “equivalent security interest.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA) is a complex statute designed 
to protect consumers from sharp practices by merchants.1  At its heart, it 
is a disclosure statute.  It mandates stiff penalties against merchants who 
fail to comply with its many statutory requirements.2  The primary 
transaction that triggers mandated compliance with the WCA is the 
consumer credit transaction.3 
There are three credit transactions that are specifically identified by 
the WCA as consumer credit transactions—consumer credit sales, 
consumer leases, and open-end credit plans.4  Each one of these 
consumer credit transactions has presented interpretation problems that 
have perplexed the courts.5  For consumer credit sales, the problem is 
distinguishing true leases or bailments, which are not subject to the 
WCA, from disguised sales, which are covered by the WCA.  The WCA 
only partially addresses this problem.  For consumer leases, the problem 
is distinguishing commercial leases from consumer leases.  And finally, 
open-end credit plans have enhanced disclosure requirements under the 
WCA.6  But, it is not an easy task to distinguish an open-end credit plan, 
with its enhanced disclosure requirements, from an ordinary credit 
transaction, which has less disclosure requirements, from a “cash 
transaction,” which has no disclosure requirements.  The first part of 
this Article will provide a comprehensive analysis of each one of these 
consumer credit transactions. 
The second part of this Article will focus on the two most common 
exclusions under the WCA—consumer transactions that exceed $25,000 
and the first lien real estate mortgage exclusion.  There are actually 
three exclusionary clauses that are part of the $25,000 exclusion: (1) 
consumer credit transactions where the amount financed exceeds 
$25,000;7 (2) motor vehicle consumer leases where the total lease 
 
1. WIS. STAT. § 421.102(2)(b) (2011–2012). 
2. See WIS. STAT. Ch. 425. 
3. See WIS. STAT. § 421.102(2)(d). 
4. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10). 
5. See Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 763 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (deciding 
“whether [] rent-to-own contracts are consumer credit sales under the WCA”); DeGrave v. 
Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1607, at *1 (Dec. 17, 1996) (deciding 
whether the co-op’s transactions constituted an open-end credit plan or ordinary credit 
transaction); Duston v. Badger Lease, No. 93-1402, 1994 Wisc. App. LEXIS 202, at *3 (Feb. 
22, 1994) (deciding whether a car lease is a commercial or consumer lease). 
6. See WIS. STAT. § 422.308. 
7. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6). 
34306-m
qt_97-1 S
heet N
o. 33 S
ide A
      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 33 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
ANZIVINO 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013  1:57 PM 
2013] WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT 57 
obligation exceeds $25,000;8 and (3) any other consumer transaction 
where the cash price exceeds $25,000.9  Each clause has its own unique 
interpretation issues.  For the first exclusionary clause, courts have 
struggled with determining whether a charge should be considered a 
finance charge, an additional charge, or part of the amount financed. 10  
In addition, when there are multiple advances between the parties, 
should the $25,000 cap be applied against each individual advance or 
simply the total of the advances?  Also, can a single advance become 
subject to the WCA even though it is greater than $25,000?  A number 
of issues have arisen with reference to the motor vehicle consumer lease 
exclusion.  How to calculate the four-month lease period, and how to 
calculate the total lease obligation are common issues.11  Finally, with 
regard to the third exclusionary clause, the two primary issues are what 
transactions are covered by “any other consumer transaction,” and how 
should the “cash price” be calculated. 
As a final matter, the scope of the first lien real estate mortgage 
exclusion is examined.  There are a number of issues considered under 
this exclusion.  One primary issue is what kind of interests qualify as an 
“equivalent security interest” to a first lien on real estate.  Also, when 
the first lien holder makes future advances, particularly difficult priority 
issues arise between the first and second lien holders. 
A. Consumer Credit Sale 
A consumer credit sale is one of the four types of consumer credit 
transactions expressly identified in the WCA.12  In fact, most consumer 
transactions would qualify as both a consumer credit sale and a 
consumer credit transaction.13  The elements of a consumer credit 
transaction and a consumer credit sale are essentially the same with one 
noted addition.  A consumer credit sale is defined as “a sale of goods, 
services or an interest in land to a customer on credit where the debt is 
 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
11. See LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d 582, 594, 589 N.W.2d 425, 430 
(Ct. App. 1998); see also Raneda v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 02-2149, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS 
616, at **1213 (July 1, 2003). 
12. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10). 
13. See, e.g., Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of Milwaukee, Inc., 123 Wis. 2d 79, 87, 
365 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Ct. App. 1985) (“[A] consumer credit sale is also a consumer credit 
transaction. . . .  The former is a species of the latter because the legislature so provided.”). 
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58 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
payable in installments or a finance charge is imposed.”14  All the basic 
elements of a consumer credit sale (goods, services, or an interest in 
land; credit; payable in installments; and finance charge) were analyzed 
in an earlier article.15  However, the definition of consumer credit sale 
expands the coverage of the WCA by including within it bailments and 
leases where the bailee or lessee pays or agrees to pay the agreed price 
and can become or has the option to become the owner of the leased or 
bailed property for no additional or nominal consideration.16  If the 
transaction does not provide that the lessee or bailee has the 
opportunity to become the owner of the property, the transaction 
cannot be a consumer credit sale.17 
The expansion of the coverage of the WCA through the noted 
addition to the consumer credit sale definition was designed to address 
the issue of whether a lease or bailment transaction is a true lease or 
bailment or a credit transaction disguised as a lease or bailment.18  The 
drafters of the WCA obviously wanted to include within its scope not 
only all traditional consumer credit transactions, but also disguised ones 
as well.19  This issue was first encountered in the Uniform Commercial 
Code20 (UCC) where statutory guidelines are prescribed for 
 
14. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(9). 
15. See Ralph C. Anzivino, The Wisconsin Consumer Act: When Is a Transaction a 
Consumer Credit Transaction?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 221–29 (2012). 
16. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(9). 
17. See Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d 64, 70–71, 432 N.W.2d 617, 
619–20 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the bailment agreement at issue created a lease 
agreement rather than a consumer credit sale). 
18. See WIS. STAT. § 421.102 (1)–(2) (explaining that the provisions and definitions of 
the WCA should be construed broadly and liberally so as to comport with the underlying 
purpose of protecting consumers); see also LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d 
582, 592–93, 589 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the WCA shall be read 
liberally “to promote the underlying purposes of the Act and [to] look[] beyond the 
transaction’s form to its substance,” and, accordingly, to include disguised transactions). 
19. See WIS. STAT. § 421.102 (1)–(2) (explaining that the provisions and definitions of 
the WCA should be construed broadly and liberally so as to comport with the underlying 
purpose of protecting consumers); see also LeBakken, 223 Wis. 2d at 592–93 (noting that the 
WCA shall be read liberally “to promote the underlying purposes of the Act and [to] look[] 
beyond the transaction’s form to its substance,” and, accordingly, to include disguised 
transactions). 
20. See Richard L. Barnes, Distinguishing Sales and Leases: A Primer on the Scope and 
Purpose of UCC Article 2A, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 873, 879 (1995) (noting the drafters 
recognition of “the confused state of the opinions dealing with the distinction between leases 
and sales involving disguised security interests”); see also U.C.C. § 1–201 cmt. 37 (2012–2013) 
(explaining that common law rules on disguised security interests were not sufficient to 
resolve the conflict and that the 1978 Official UCC Text was an attempt to remedy this 
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distinguishing a lease21 from a security interest.22 
One of the more difficult issues when confronted with determining 
whether a transaction is a disguised consumer credit sale (subject to the 
WCA) or a true lease or bailment (not subject to the WCA) is whether 
the contract provides that the bailee or lessee can become the owner of 
the property by paying a nominal option price either during or at the 
end of the term of the contract.  Wisconsin courts use four tests when 
determining whether a customer’s option price is nominal.23  In Burney 
v. Thorn Americas, Inc., the issue arose of “whether rent-to-own 
contracts are consumer credit sales under the WCA.”24  Rent-A-Center 
argued that since “the customer has no obligation to renew [under the 
rent-to-own] agreement, there is no debt, and the WCA cannot apply.”25  
The court, however, noted that the WCA covers transactions where the 
customer pays or agrees to pay money under the rental or bailment 
agreement.26  As a result, a transaction could be a consumer credit sale 
whether the customer has paid or agrees to pay under the agreement.27  
The court also addressed the applicability of the UCC to similar 
statutory language in the WCA.28  The court concluded that the 
language in the UCC should not be used when interpreting the WCA 
because the language used in each statute is different, and because the 
UCC was primarily designed to deal with commercial transactions, not 
consumer transactions.29  Further, the court noted that Wisconsin courts 
use four tests when determining whether a customer’s option price is 
nominal.30  Those four tests are as follows: (1) “the option price’s 
relation to the item’s fair market value”; (2) “the option price’s relation 
to the total payments” under the contract; (3) “the option price’s 
 
problem). 
21. WIS. STAT. § 411.102 (noting that a true lease is subject to Chapter 411 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes); U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. 2 (noting that a true lease is subject to Article 2A of 
the UCC). 
22. See WIS. STAT. § 401.203; WIS. STAT. § 409.109 (noting that a credit transaction is 
subject to Chapter 409 of the Wisconsin Statutes); U.C.C. § 2A-103 cmt. (noting that a credit 
transaction is subject to Article 9 of the UCC). 
23. Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 770 (E.D. Wis. 1996). 
24. Id. at 763. 
25. Id. at 767. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. See id. at 767–68 (discussing defendants’ attempt to analogize the WCA with the 
UCC). 
29. Id. at 768. 
30. Id. at 770. 
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60 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
relation to the original price”; and (4) whether paying the option price is 
the most sensible alternative under the circumstances.31  Whether the 
customer has the option to pay the option price in a lump sum payment 
or installments does not affect the fact that it must be determined 
whether the option price is nominal.32 
Several tests discussed in Burney were used by the court in Rent-A-
Center, Inc. v. Hall.33  In Hall, the customer signed a rental agreement to 
rent a new washer and dryer on a monthly basis.34  Pursuant to the 
agreement, the customer had “the option to purchase the appliances 
after 19 months of successive renewals at [the] then fair market value 
not to exceed $161.91.”35  The agreement also had a cap of $1643.15.36  In 
a subsequent dispute between the parties, the merchant asserted that 
the rental agreement “was not a ‘consumer credit sale’ subject to the 
[WCA].”37  The court noted that there are two prerequisites that must 
be satisfied before a lease or bailment becomes a consumer credit sale.38  
The customer “must have either paid or agreed to pay a sum [equal] to 
or in excess of the . . . value of the goods.”39  Also, “the agreement must 
provide that [the customer] . . . will become, or for no other or a 
nominal consideration has the option to become, the owner of the 
goods . . . upon full compliance with the terms of the agreement.”40  With 
regard to the second prerequisite, the merchant asserted that the UCC, 
which provides a detailed analysis to determine when a lease is intended 
as security,41 should be applied by analogy to the consumer credit sale 
determination.42  The court, however, refused to apply the UCC 
statutory standards to the WCA because the court believed it might 
narrow the broad scope of the WCA.43  In addition, the court indicated 
that the UCC statutory standards are useful when applied to large 
 
31. Id. (citing Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Hall, 181 Wis. 2d 243, 255, 510 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Ct. 
App. 1993)). 
32. Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 668, 674 (E.D. Wis. 1997). 
33. Hall, 181 Wis. 2d 243. 
34. Id. at 246. 
35. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 249. 
38. Id. at 249–50. 
39. Id. at 250 (internal quotations omitted). 
40. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
41. Id. at 253. 
42. Hall, 181 Wis. 2d at 253–55 & n.8. 
43. Id. 
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2013] WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT 61 
commercial transactions but do not apply particularly well to small 
consumer transactions.44  Even though the court indicated that the UCC 
statutory standards do not translate very well to small consumer 
transactions, the primary means by which a bailee or lessee becomes the 
owner of the goods or property are exactly the same under both the 
UCC and the WCA—whether the bailee or lessee can become the 
owner of the goods for no additional or nominal consideration.45  
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the payment of $161.91 at the 
end of the lease term was nominal.46  The court compared the amount 
the lessee would have paid under the agreement for the appliances over 
the term of the agreement ($1,481.42) with $161.19, which was the final 
purchase price, and concluded it was a nominal sum.47  In addition, the 
court noted that anyone who had already paid $1,481.42 would have “no 
sensible” alternative other than to pay the option price and become the 
owner.48  As a result, the court held the rental agreement to be a 
consumer credit sale.49 
The “no sensible alternative” test is further illustrated in LeBakken 
Rent-To-Own v. Warnell.50  In LeBakken, a customer entered into a 
rent-to-own agreement for a refrigerator.51  The agreement contained an 
option price whereby the customer had the option to purchase the 
refrigerator.52  The merchant argued that the transaction was not a 
consumer credit sale, but rather the agreement anticipated two 
transactions.53  The first transaction is a “true rental agreement” 
between the merchant and customer, and the second transaction, if the 
customer “exercises the option to purchase,” is a sale.54  The court 
 
44. Id. 
45. Compare WIS. STAT. § 421.301(9) (2011–2012) (“[T]he bailee or lessee will become, 
or for no other or a nominal consideration has the option to become, the owner of the goods 
or real property upon full compliance with the terms of the agreement.”), with WIS. STAT. 
§ 401.203(2)(d) (“The lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no 
additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the 
lease agreement.”). 
46. Hall, 181 Wis. 2d at 256. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 255–56. 
50. LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d 582, 593, 589 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Ct. 
App. 1998). 
51. Id. at 585–86. 
52. Id. at 586. 
53. Id. at 590. 
54. Id. 
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62 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
disagreed with the merchant’s analysis.55  Rather, the court decided to 
analyze the two prerequisites to a consumer credit sale when a lease or 
bailment is involved.56  The first prerequisite is that the customer must 
have either paid or agreed to pay a sum equal to or in excess of the 
value of the goods.57  The court noted that the customer had two options 
during the term of the rental agreement to purchase the refrigerator.58  
Under the first option, after one month, the customer could pay $526.95 
for a refrigerator that was worth $551.08.59  Under the second option, at 
the end of the lease term, if all the customer’s payments totaled 
$1,102.15, the customer could become the owner of the refrigerator.60  
Under both options, it was clear to the court that the customer could 
pay a sum equal to or in excess of the value of the goods.61  The first 
prerequisite was satisfied.62  The second prerequisite is that the customer 
has the option to become the owner of the property for no additional or 
nominal consideration.63  The agreement provided that at the end of the 
lease term the customer could become the owner of the refrigerator by 
paying an additional $179.95.64  The court indicated that a reasonable 
person “who had already paid $922.50 for a refrigerator would have ‘no 
sensible alternative’ [but] to pay $179.95 [to] become the owner of the 
goods.”65  Therefore, the court concluded that the option price was 
nominal, and the transaction was a consumer credit sale.66 
A lease or bailment transaction can also become a consumer credit 
sale if the lessee or bailee can become the owner of the goods at the end 
of the agreed term for no additional consideration.67  A case of no 
additional consideration, as opposed to nominal consideration, is 
illustrated by Snowbank v. Bradwell.68  In Snowbank, a customer 
 
55. Id. (finding that the transaction was a consumer credit transaction). 
56. Id. at 591. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 592. 
61. Id. at 591–92. 
62. Id. at 592. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 593. 
66. Id. 
67. Snowbank v. Bradwell, No. 2007AP2308, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 274, at *5–6 (Apr. 
8, 2008). 
68. Id. at *1. 
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entered into a contract to purchase a trailer.69  The parties completed a 
receipt indicating the buyer paid $520 down and had a balance of $89.97 
due within seven days.70  The buyer took immediate possession of the 
trailer, but the seller did not transfer title at that time.71  Subsequently, 
the buyer did not pay the balance due, and the seller took the trailer 
from the buyer without notice to or consent of the buyer.72  In 
subsequent litigation between the parties, the issue became whether the 
transaction was a consumer credit sale.73  The court noted that a 
consumer credit sale includes a bailment “if the bailee . . . pays or agrees 
to pay an amount . . . equivalent to or in excess of the . . . value of the 
goods, and . . . for no [additional] or a nominal consideration has the 
option to become . . . the owner of the goods.”74  The court concluded 
that this transaction fell squarely within the coverage of the WCA.75  
The buyer had clearly taken possession of the property, which 
constitutes a bailment.76  The receipt clearly indicated that the buyer had 
a balance due to the seller.77  And, the buyer could become the owner of 
the property by paying “the remainder of the balance” due.78  The 
agreement, therefore, was subject to the WCA.79 
Finally, the lease or bailment agreement may still qualify as a 
consumer credit transaction even though the agreement includes a 
termination clause in favor of the bailee or lessee, or the bailee or lessee 
is not contractually required to make all the payments under the 
contract.80  For example, in Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of 
Milwaukee, Inc., a customer entered into a rent-to-own agreement with 
a merchant for a television whereby the customer would become the 
 
69. Id. at *1–2. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at *2. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at *4–5 (explaining that the question of whether the agreement at issue was a 
consumer credit transaction “is a mixed question of fact and law” (citing LeBakken Rent-To-
Own v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d 582, 589, 589 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Ct. App. 1998))). 
74. Id. at *5–6 (quoting Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of Milwaukee, Inc., 123 
Wis. 2d 79, 84, 365 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
75. Snowbank, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 274, at *6. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. See Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of Milwaukee, Inc., 123 Wis. 2d 79, 81, 88, 
365 N.W.2d 882, 884, 887 (Ct. App. 1985). 
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owner of the goods after making seventy-eight consecutive weekly 
payments of $23 per week.81  The lease agreement contained a 
termination clause.82  When litigation ensued between the parties, the 
merchant argued that the transaction was not covered by the WCA 
because it was not a consumer credit sale.83  Essentially the merchant’s 
argument was that there was no consumer credit transaction because the 
customer was not obligated by the lease agreement to make installment 
payments.84  The court, however, had a different view.  The court 
reasoned that a consumer credit transaction occurs when a “debt is 
payable in installments or a finance charge is imposed.”85  The lease 
agreement between the parties did include a time-price differential (the 
difference between the cash sales price and the total price through the 
installments), and as such, qualified as a consumer credit transaction.86  
Therefore, the court held that there is no requirement that there be an 
obligation to make payments in order for a transaction to qualify as a 
consumer credit sale.87  The rental agreement was held to be a consumer 
credit sale.88 
If the intent of the legislature was to increase the protection of the 
WCA by including all leases and bailments disguised as sales into the 
definition of consumer credit sales, the legislature significantly missed 
the mark.  The only lease or bailment that falls within the definition of a 
consumer credit sale is one where the bailee or lessee will become or has 
the option to become the owner of the bailed or leased item for no 
additional or nominal consideration.89  What about the lease or bailment 
that contains an option price that is not a nominal one, but yet the 
economics of the transaction are such that exercising the option is the 
only reasonable decision?  The proposed transaction is clearly not a true 
bailment or lease but rather a disguised sale.  These cases are entirely 
missed by the WCA’s definition of a consumer credit sale.  For example, 
in In re Grubbs Construction Co., Grubbs entered into a Master Lease 
 
81. Id. at 81. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 85. 
84. Id. 
85. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(9) (2011–2012); see also Palacios, 123 Wis. 2d at 87 (citing WIS. 
STAT. § 421.301(9)). 
86. Palacios, 123 Wis. 2d at 87–88. 
87. Id. at 88. 
88. Id. 
89. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(9). 
34306-m
qt_97-1 S
heet N
o. 37 S
ide A
      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 37 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
ANZIVINO 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013  1:57 PM 
2013] WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT 65 
Agreement for the lease of several pieces of equipment, and during 
Grubbs’ Chapter 11 bankruptcy case it became important to determine 
if the leases were true leases or disguised sales.90  Four of the leases 
contained “Early Buyout Options” that Grubbs could exercise.91  There 
were actually three options that were available to Grubbs.92  The first 
option, which was available upon the sixty-sixth month of the lease, 
provided for an option price of $163,327.50, which together with the 
prior monthly lease payments, would total $637,687.32.93  The second 
option, which was available upon the seventy-second month of the lease, 
provided for an option price of $131,250.00, which together with the 
prior monthly lease payments, would total $648,733.44.94  And finally, 
the third option was to renew the leases at the end of the lease term for 
an additional fourteen months at a cost of $134,020.32, which would 
result in total lease payments of $659,020.32.95  Clearly, none of the 
option prices were nominal since they ranged from a low of $131,250.00 
to a high of $163,327.50.  Based on the economics of the transaction, the 
court reasoned that Grubbs had no choice but to purchase the 
equipment.96  As a result, the court concluded that the lease agreements 
were in fact disguised sales, not true leases.97  Obviously the Grubbs 
transaction is not a consumer transaction, but the point is that not all 
disguised consumer credit sales are anticipated by the nominal 
consideration standard.  In those consumer cases where the option price 
is not nominal, the courts will need to consider the economic realities of 
the transaction as the court did in Grubbs to catch all the disguised 
consumer credit sale transactions. 
B. Consumer Lease 
A consumer credit transaction also includes consumer leases.98  A 
consumer lease is “a lease of goods [by] a merchant . . . to a customer for 
a term exceeding 4 months.”99  A consumer lease does not include a 
 
90. In re Grubbs Constr. Co., 319 B.R. 698, 703 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005). 
91. Id. at 704. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 705. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 706. 
96. Id. at 720–21. 
97. Id. at 724. 
98. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (2011–2012). 
99. Id. § 421.301(11). 
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lease of real property. 100 
There are a number of issues that arise under the WCA’s definition 
of consumer leases.  First, it must be determined whether the lease is a 
consumer or commercial lease.  A recital in the lease that the lease is a 
commercial or business lease is not controlling.101  Rather, the courts 
consider a number of factors in reaching a determination.102  Second, if 
the lessee has the option to purchase the goods at any time, does the 
option convert the lease into one for a term less than four months?  
And, third, for leases that are expressly agreed to be less than four 
months, if the lessee’s payments actually exceed four months, does that 
fact convert the lease into one for a term greater than four months? 
The leading case addressing the distinction between a commercial or 
business lease and a consumer lease is Duston v. Badger Lease.103  In 
Duston, a customer leased a used car from a merchant.104  The lease 
agreement required the customer to make forty-two bi-weekly payments 
of $50, and after the forty-two payments were made, the customer could 
purchase the car for an additional $4.105  Subsequently, the merchant 
repossessed the car without complying with the WCA’s statutory 
requirements.106  When litigation ensued, the issue before the court was 
whether the car lease was a commercial or consumer lease.107  The lease 
specifically provided that the car should be used solely in the conduct of 
the lessee’s business.108  Based on that contract language, the merchant 
argued that “the lease was unambiguous and must be read as a 
commercial lease.”109  The trial court, however, did not rely on the recital 
in the lease but rather analyzed a number of factors in reaching its 
decision.110  First, the court noted that the lease was titled “Equipment 
Lease.”111  Second, the lease did not state whether it was a commercial or 
 
100. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.05 (July 2007). 
101. Duston v. Badger Lease, No. 93-1402, 1994 Wisc. App. LEXIS 202, at *4 (Feb. 22, 
1994). 
102. Id. at *4–6. 
103. Id. at *2. 
104. Id. at *1. 
105. Id. at *1–2. 
106. Id. at *2–3. 
107. Id. at *3 (explaining that Badger argued that the lease was a “commercial lease” not 
subject to the WCA). 
108. Id. at *4. 
109. Id. 
110. See id. at *4–6 (discussing considerations taken into account by the trial court). 
111. Id. at *4. 
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consumer lease.112  Third, the evidence indicated that the consumer had 
told the merchant at the time of contracting that she wanted to use the 
car to visit her sister.113  Fourth, the address of the customer on the lease 
agreement was the customer’s home address, not a business address.114  
Fifth, the evidence indicated that the merchant knew at the time of 
contracting that the customer was not going to use the vehicle in her 
course of employment, but rather simply to commute to her place of 
employment.115  And finally, the court noted that in cases of ambiguity, 
the court should construe the document against the drafter, which was 
the merchant.116  As a result of those factors, the court held that despite 
the contract recital, the lease was a consumer lease and the merchant 
should have followed the WCA’s procedures when the merchant 
repossessed the vehicle.117 
The WCA requirement that the lease exceed four months has 
created a couple of interesting issues.  First, if the lease grants the lessee 
the option to purchase the goods at any time, does that convert the lease 
into a term for less than four months?  Second, if the lease is for an 
expressed term less than four months, but payments actually exceed the 
four-month period, does that convert the lease into one for a term 
greater than four months?  The option to purchase issue was addressed 
in LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell.118  In LeBakken, a customer 
entered into a lease transaction with a merchant.119  In subsequent 
litigation between the parties, the issue became whether the lease 
between the parties was a consumer lease for a term exceeding four 
months.120  The merchant argued that “the lease was not for a period 
exceeding four months because [the customer] could exercise 
[an] . . . option [to] purchase the refrigerator” prior to that time.121  The 
 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at *5. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at *6. 
118. LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d 582, 589, 589 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Ct. 
App. 1998). 
119. Id. at 585–86. 
120. Id. at 590 (explaining that the merchant claimed compliance with the WCA was not 
required because the agreement was not a consumer credit transaction, which includes within 
its definition a “consumer lease” (citing WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10))). 
121. Id. at 594. 
34306-m
qt_97-1 S
heet N
o. 38 S
ide B
      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 38 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
ANZIVINO 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013  1:57 PM 
68 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
court first noted that the term “lease” is not defined by the WCA.122  The 
court further noted that the WCA provides that if it does not define a 
term, that term shall have the meaning given to it in the UCC.123  
Therefore, the court adopted the definition of a lease under Chapter 411 
of the Wisconsin Statutes, which provides that “a lease is a transfer of 
the right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for 
consideration.”124  Next, the court addressed whether the consumer’s 
contractual right to purchase the refrigerator prior to the end of the 
four-month period disqualified the lease from being a consumer lease.125  
The court noted that the customer had the right under the lease to use 
the refrigerator for up to twenty months.126  The merchant, on the other 
hand, “could only terminate the [lease] if [the customer] did not make 
his payments or otherwise breached the agreement.”127  Therefore, the 
court reasoned that the merchant was bound to the lease agreement for 
twenty months unless the customer breached the agreement.128  Based 
on those facts, the court held that the merchant’s lease to the customer 
was for a term that exceeded four months.129 
The issue of whether a lease for less than four months is converted 
into one for greater than four months when the payments extend 
beyond the agreed payment period was addressed in Ron Jensen 
Chevrolet-Olds, Inc. v. Poulton.130  In Ron Jensen, a consumer leased an 
automobile for ninety days, but the payments actually exceeded the 
four-month period.131  The court, however, held that the fact that the 
payments exceeded the four-month period did not cause the lease to be 
subject to the WCA.132  The court reasoned that the fact that the lessee’s 
payments exceeded the four-month period was “analogous to . . . a 
tenant who holds over beyond the expiration of [a] lease.”133  The tenant 
holdover does not extend the term of the lease, nor did the late 
 
122. Id. at 594 n.8. 
123. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 421.103(2)). 
124. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 411.103(1)(j)). 
125. Id. at 594–95.  
126. Id. at 594.  
127. Id. at 595. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Ron Jensen Chevrolet-Olds, Inc. v. Poulton, No. 92-1770, 1993 Wisc. App. LEXIS 
82, at *2 (Jan. 26, 1993). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
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payments extend the term of the auto lease.134 
C. Open-End Credit Plan 
There are actually three types of transactions that can occur when a 
customer owes money to a merchant.  The transaction could be one that 
was anticipated to be a cash transaction, but the customer did not pay as 
agreed; the transaction could be a simple credit transaction;135 or the 
transaction could be one that arose from an open-end credit plan.136  The 
credit and open-end credit transactions are subject to the WCA while 
the cash transaction is not.137  It is important to distinguish the simple 
credit transaction from the open-end credit transaction because the 
open-end credit transaction has more disclosure requirements and those 
enhanced disclosures must occur prior to contracting.138 
An open-end credit plan is one of the specified types of a consumer 
credit transaction.139  An open-end credit plan is “consumer credit 
extended on an account pursuant to a plan under which” all of the 
following apply: (1) “[t]he creditor . . . permit[s] the customer to make 
purchases or obtain loans, from time to time, directly from the creditor 
or indirectly by use of a credit card, check or other device, as the plan 
may provide;” (2) the customer may “[pay] the balance in full or in 
installments;” (3) “[a] finance charge may be computed by the creditor 
from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance;” and (4) “[t]he 
creditor has treated the transaction as open-end consumer credit for 
purposes of any disclosures required under the federal consumer credit 
protection act.”140  A credit plan will “not be considered an open-end 
credit plan, even though it [otherwise] meets the criteria” for an open-
end credit plan, if the creditor treats the transaction as an ordinary 
credit transaction.141 
“In order to obligate a [customer for any liability] arising out of an 
open-end credit plan, the merchant must . . . obtain the signature of [the 
 
134. Id. 
135. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (2011–2012). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. (defining credit and open-end credit transactions as consumer credit 
transactions, while a cash transaction is not defined as such). 
138. See id. § 422.308(1) (setting forth numerous disclosure requirements for open-end 
credit transactions). 
139. Id. § 421.301(10). 
140. Id. § 421.301(27)(a). 
141. Id. § 421.301(27)(c). 
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customer] on the writing evidencing the consumer credit transaction.”142  
The signature requirement can be accomplished in one of three ways.143  
First, the customer can sign the “open-end credit agreement setting 
forth all of the terms of the . . . plan including the [required] credit 
disclosures.”144  Second, the customer can sign 
[a] credit application which expressly states that each [customer] 
signing the application will be obligated according to the terms of 
the open-end credit agreement . . . provided the creditor mails or 
delivers to each customer who signs the application a copy of the 
open-end credit agreement before that customer makes any 
charges on the account.145 
Or, third, the customer signs 
[a] transaction receipt which expressly states that each 
[customer] signing the receipt will be obligated according to the 
terms of the open-end credit agreement . . . provided the creditor 
has mailed or delivered a copy of the open-end credit agreement 
to that customer before that customer makes any charges on the 
account.146 
The critical factor when distinguishing between an open-end credit 
plan and an ordinary credit transaction is the creditor’s conduct when 
the debt is not paid in full. 
[W]hen a merchant’s billings are not paid in full within a 
stipulated time period and . . . the merchant does not, in fact, 
regard such accounts [to be] in default (For example, by 
customarily failing to institute collection activity or by continuing 
to extend credit) and imposes charges periodically for [the] 
delay[ed] payment of such accounts . . . until paid [in full], the 
charge so imposed [is] . . . a finance charge and the credit so 
extended comes within the definition of [an] open-end credit 
[plan].147 
The traditional open-end credit plan is illustrated by Patzka v. Viterbo 
 
142. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.351 (July 2007). 
143. See id. § 1.351(1)–(3). 
144. Id. § 1.351(1). 
145. Id. § 1.351(2). 
146. Id. § 1.351(3). 
147. Id. § 1.07. 
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College.148  In Patzka, a student received a loan from a college for 
tuition.149  At the time of her registration, the college did not provide any 
information regarding the terms of her loan.150  In subsequent litigation 
between the parties, both parties agreed that her financial arrangement 
with the college was an open-end credit plan.151 
The test used by the courts when distinguishing an open-end credit 
plan from an ordinary credit transaction is an objective one.152  In 
DeGrave v. Door County Cooperative, customers were members of a co-
op and periodically made purchases for their farm on credit.153  The co-
op’s invoices provided that all purchases were due within the following 
month and that a finance charge of 1.5% per month would be assessed 
on the outstanding balance less credits and payments.154  When litigation 
ensued between the parties, the issue became whether the transaction 
was an open-end credit plan subject to enhanced disclosures prior to 
contracting.155  The court noted that in order to qualify as an open-end 
credit plan, the co-op’s plan must satisfy four required elements.156  The 
co-op asserted that one element was missing in that the co-op never 
extended the privilege of paying the balance in installments to the 
customers.157  The narrow issue before the court was whether the 
agreement between the parties permitted the customers to pay in 
installments.158  The court used an objective test and inquired whether “a 
reasonable person reading [the] terms could believe [that] the co-op 
permitted payments after the due date.”159  The court concluded that the 
terms contained in the co-op’s invoices impliedly permitted the member 
to pay in installments, and the only consequence of such payments after 
the due date would be the imposition of a finance charge.160  Thus, the 
 
148. Patzka v. Viterbo Coll., 917 F. Supp. 654, 659 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
149. Id. at 657. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 659. 
152. DeGrave v. Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1607, at *7 
(Dec. 17, 1996). 
153. Id. at *2. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at *1 (explaining that the customers alleged that the merchant violated the 
WCA by charging interest and repossessing the customers’ stock and dividends). 
156. Id. at *5. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at *7. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
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transaction was an open-end credit plan and subject to the WCA.161 
Application of the objective test has resulted in courts finding that 
the parties’ relationship was simply an ordinary credit transaction and 
not an open-end credit plan.162  In Huser Implement, Inc. v. Wendt, a 
customer “purchased a four-wheel-drive . . . tractor and some other farm 
machinery from [the merchant] . . . with financing from John Deere 
Credit Services.”163  For several years, the merchant extended credit to 
the customer for other goods and services and imposed a finance charge 
on the customer on the unpaid balance from time to time, but did not 
disclose the percentage rate charged.164  When litigation ensued between 
the parties, the customer claimed that the merchant violated the WCA 
by failing to provide the necessary disclosures pursuant to an open-end 
credit plan.165  The merchant “dispute[d] that the parties had an open-
end credit plan,” and instead characterized their relationship as an 
“ordinary credit transaction[].”166  The court concluded that the parties 
did not have an open-end credit plan because the merchant “billed [the 
customer] on monthly invoices for all goods and services provided 
and . . . no written credit plan existed” between the parties.167 
Finally, the objective test has been used by courts to find that a 
transaction was a cash transaction and not a credit transaction.168  In 
Alaskan Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, the customers entered into a contract 
for the installation of two fireplaces.169  Financing terms were never 
discussed, and the contracts signed by the customers indicated that 
payment was to be made “net 30 days [with a 1.5%] monthly service 
charge for overdue invoices.”170  When litigation ensued between the 
parties, the issue became whether the customers had an open-end credit 
plan.171  The court noted that the 1.5% service charge was imposed for 
 
161. Id. at *7–8 (holding that “the transactions constituted an open-end credit plan”). 
162. See Huser Implement, Inc. v. Wendt, No. 98-1066-FT, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 
1136, at *7 (Oct. 1, 1998) (holding that “the parties did not have an open-ended credit plan”). 
163. Id. at *1–2. 
164. Id. at *2. 
165. Id. at *6. 
166. Id. at *7. 
167. Id. 
168. See Alaskan Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, No. 02-3016-FT, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS 
581, at **13 (June 18, 2003) (agreeing with the trial court in holding that the transaction that 
took place was a cash transaction and did not constitute a credit transaction). 
169. Id. at **2. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at **12 (explaining that the customers argued that the transaction was an “open-
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late payments,172 and also that the merchant viewed the account to be in 
default.173  Further, the court concluded that the customers did not have 
“the privilege of paying the balance in full or in installments,” but rather 
“payment was required [to be made] in full within thirty days.”174  As a 
result of the foregoing, the court concluded that the transaction was not 
a consumer credit transaction subject to the WCA.175 
II. WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT EXCLUSIONS 
A. In General 
There are ten enumerated exclusions in the WCA.176  The WCA does 
not apply to extensions of credit to organizations177 or to transactions in 
which all parties to the transaction are organizations.178  The WCA does 
not apply to motor vehicle leases unless the lease is for personal, family, 
household, or agricultural use.179  For a mixed-use vehicle, 50% or more 
of the use must be for personal, family, household, agricultural use, or 
some combination thereof.180  There are also specified exclusions for 
transactions involving public utilities,181 common carriers,182 electric 
cooperatives,183 pawnbrokers,184 the sale of insurance,185 and the sale of 
securities.186 
The WCA states that it does not apply to transactions that are 
primarily for an agricultural purpose, but that can be misleading.187  The 
 
end credit plan”). 
172. Id. at **11. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at **12. 
175. Id. at **13. 
176. WIS. STAT. § 421.202 (2011–2012). 
177. See WIS. STAT. § 421.202(1); see also WIS. STAT. § 421.301(28) (“‘Organization[s]’ 
[include] a corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, trust, estate, 
limited liability company, partnership, cooperative or association other than a cooperative 
organized under ch. 185 or 193 which has gross annual revenues not exceeding $5 million.”). 
178. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(2). 
179. Id. § 421.202(9). 
180. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DFI-WCA 1.06 (July 2007). 
181. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(3). 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. § 421.202(4). 
185. Id. § 421.202(5). 
186. Id. § 421.202(8). 
187. Id. § 421.202(10). 
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WCA debt collection provisions in Chapter 427 do apply to transactions 
that are for an agricultural purpose.188  Also, any motor vehicle leased 
for an agricultural purpose is subject to the WCA.189  And finally, any 
credit transaction that is primarily for an agricultural purpose is subject 
to section 422.210, which states that a creditor must clearly disclose in 
writing any finance charge or fee to be able to collect the charge or 
fee.190 
B. The $25,000 Cap 
Certain other consumer transactions are also excluded from 
coverage under the WCA.  There are three consumer transactions that 
exceed $25,000 that are excluded from WCA coverage.191  The theory 
underlying the $25,000 exclusion is that “consumers entering 
transactions involving $25,000 or less” need the protection of the WCA, 
but that “consumers entering transactions involving larger amounts 
are . . . able to protect themselves.”192  However, in those cases where the 
transaction exceeds $25,000, the lender can opt to provide WCA 
protections.193 
The first $25,000 exclusion is any consumer credit transaction where 
the “amount financed” is greater than $25,000.194  The amount financed 
is a different amount depending upon whether the consumer credit 
transaction is a consumer credit sale or a consumer loan.  For a 
consumer credit sale, the amount financed is the cash price of the real or 
personal property or services,195 less the amount of any down payment 
whether made in cash or in property traded in,196 plus the “amount 
actually paid or to be paid by the creditor pursuant to an agreement 
with the customer to discharge a security interest in or a lien on [the] 
property traded in” by the customer.197  For a consumer loan, the 
 
188. Id. 
189. See WIS. STAT. §§ 421.301(25m), 429.104(9). 
190. WIS. STAT. §§ 421.202(10), 422.210(1). 
191. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6). 
192. Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Geiger, 118 Wis. 2d 140, 145, 345 N.W.2d 527, 529–30 
(Ct. App. 1984). 
193. Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 169 Wis. 2d 437, 455–56, 485 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
194. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6); Valley W. Bank v. Bennett, No. 85-1816, 1986 Wisc. App. 
LEXIS 3865, at *2 (Sept. 9, 1986). 
195. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(5)(a). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. § 421.301(5)(b). 
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amount financed is the amount paid to or receivable by the customer or 
another person on the customer’s behalf.198  To the extent that the 
charges are not already included in the prior amounts, the amount 
financed for both consumer credit sales and consumer loans should also 
include any taxes,199 any amounts paid or to be paid by the creditor for 
registration, certificate of title or license fees,200 and any other charges 
permitted under section 422.202.201 
As noted above, the amount financed includes additional charges, 
but not finance charges.  Therefore, it is very important to distinguish 
the two different types of charges.  In Burney v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 
the court had to calculate the amount financed and also to distinguish 
additional charges from finance charges.202  In Burney, the court was first 
faced with the issue of whether rent-to-own transactions were consumer 
credit sales under the WCA.203  After the court concluded that the 
transactions were covered by the WCA, the court held that Rent-A-
Center had violated the WCA and must pay damages.204  The damage 
calculation under the WCA required the court to calculate the finance 
charges in the transaction.205  The larger the finance charges, the larger 
the damages payable by Rent-A-Center.206  In its effort to reduce the 
calculation of finance charges, Rent-A-Center argued that it provides 
various services to its customers (delivery, maintenance, and 
terminability), whose costs should have been included in the amount 
financed, and not treated as part of the finance charges.207  The court 
noted that “a finance charge [is] any charge that is a condition of the 
extension of credit.”208  On the other hand, the amount financed for a 
consumer credit sale is the cash price plus other allowable additional 
charges.209  As a result, the court concluded that if a customer “can buy 
the service by paying cash,” the item is properly a part of the amount 
 
198. Id. § 421.301(5)(a). 
199. Id. § 421.301(5)(c)1. 
200. Id. § 421.301(5)(c)2. 
201. Id. § 421.301(5)(c)3. 
202. Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 773–76 (E.D. Wis. 1996). 
203. Id. at 763. 
204. Id. at 773. 
205. Id. 
206. See id. at 773 (noting that to calculate the precise amount of damages it is first 
necessary to determine what the finance charge was in the transactions). 
207. Id. at 774. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 775. 
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financed; whereas “if [the] service is available only to those [paying] 
over time,” the cost should be “part of the finance charge.”210  Further, 
the court indicated that “[f]or an additional charge to be part of the 
amount financed, the customer must have the [opportunity] to refuse 
the service.”211  Thus, “[i]f the customer . . . has no alternative but to take 
the additional service and pay the additional cost, such a charge is a 
condition of the extension of credit and [thereby a] finance charge.”212 
Both parties in Burney agreed that the retail price of the item being 
sold was part of the amount financed.213  They disagreed on the 
treatment of delivery charges, maintenance, and terminability.  Rent-A-
Center argued that the cost of delivery should be added to the amount 
financed.214  However, the court concluded that Rent-A-Center factored 
the cost of delivery into every retail price, and as such, it would be 
double counting to add it to the amount financed.215  Rent-A-Center 
made a similar argument with regard to its maintenance costs.216  
However, the court reasoned that the maintenance service is not an 
extra service for sale for cash, and as such, could not be added to the 
amount financed.217  Finally, the court analyzed the cost of terminability.  
Terminability is the cost associated with permitting the customers to 
return goods without penalty at the end of any period.218  Rent-A-Center 
argued that the cost of terminability should not be part of the finance 
charge because it is a cost incurred when goods are returned and credit 
is not extended to a customer.219  The court disagreed.220  The court 
reasoned that the cost of terminability is the price the customer pays for 
not buying an item outright, and as such, is the equivalent of interest, 
which is akin to a finance charge.221  Further, the costs of terminability 
only arise when an item is purchased over time as opposed to an 
outright cash sale.222  Thus, the court concluded that the “amount 
 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 775–76. 
219. Id. at 775. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 776. 
222. Id. 
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financed include[d] only the retail price” of each item.223 
Once the amount financed is determined by the court on a single 
loan, it is a simple matter to decide if that amount is greater than 
$25,000, and if so, the transaction is not subject to the WCA.224  
However, perplexing issues arise when there is more than one loan or 
advance between the parties.  In In re Ingersoll, Mr. Ingersoll obtained 
loans from a number of banks while engaged in sod farming and other 
businesses.225  During Mr. Ingersoll’s subsequent bankruptcy, the 
applicability of the WCA to Mr. Ingersoll’s numerous loans became an 
issue.226  Mr. Ingersoll procured the loans as an individual, but there was 
a dispute as to the nature of the loans.227  The court ruled that the loans 
procured for commercial or business purposes were not subject to the 
WCA, but those procured for an agricultural purpose228 were subject to 
the WCA.229  Specifically, the court held that the Ixonia bank loans were 
consumer credit transactions within the purview of the WCA.230  
Although the Ixonia loan balance was approximately $140,000, the 
advances comprising that amount “were made at various times [and] in 
varying amounts.”231  Only one advance, however, was in an amount of 
less than $25,000.232  For that advance, the court held that the WCA was 
applicable.233  For those advances in excess of the $25,000 exclusion, the 
court concluded that the WCA was not applicable.234 
Despite the $25,000 exclusion, advances in excess of $25,000 can 
become subject to the WCA either by express statement or implication.  
 
223. Id. 
224. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs v. Sawyer, No. 2006AP1829, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 900, 
at *5 (Oct. 16, 2007); Hauer v. Union State Bank of Wautoma, 192 Wis. 2d 576, 604 n.13, 532 
N.W.2d 456, 467 n.13 (Ct. App. 1995); Meas v. Young, 142 Wis. 2d 95, 107, 417 N.W.2d 55, 59 
(Ct. App. 1987); First Wis. Nat’l Bank of Sheboygan v. Kielisch, No. 86-2334, 1987 Wisc. App. 
LEXIS 4151, at *3 (Oct. 14, 1987); Valley W. Bank v. Bennett, No. 85-1816, 1986 Wisc. App. 
LEXIS 3865, at *2 (Sept. 9, 1986). 
225. Ixonia State Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), 8 B.R. 912, 914 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 
1981). 
226. Id. at 916. 
227. Id. 
228. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(10) (2011–2012); see also 1997 Wis. Act 302 (restricting the 
WCA coverage for agricultural transactions to more limited requirements under the WCA). 
229. Ingersoll, 8 B.R. at 916. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 916–17. 
233. Id. at 917. 
234. Id. 
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In Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, the debtors executed a Consumer Real 
Estate Security Agreement (CRESA) in 1979 that secured the original 
loan and granted the Bank of Barron a continuing lien on the debtors’ 
real property for any credit granted in the future.235  In 1986, the debtors 
executed a second mortgage to a second lender.236  After the second 
mortgage was recorded, the Bank of Barron made a series of five 
advances to the debtors.237  Two of the advances exceeded the $25,000 
cap and the other three did not.238  For the two advances that exceeded 
the $25,000 cap, the second mortgage holder argued that those advances 
could not relate back to the 1979 CRESA because the WCA does not 
apply to transactions that exceed $25,000.239  The court reasoned, 
however, that a security agreement containing a future advance clause 
should be given effect according to its own terms.240  In the court’s 
opinion, the security agreement was clear that the lien on their property 
would secure all current and future debt between the parties.241  Further, 
the security agreement did not limit future advances to $25,000 or less.242  
Therefore, the court held that the Bank of Barron had opted for WCA 
coverage for the one advance that exceeded the $25,000 cap where the 
loan documents evidencing the advance referred back to the 1979 
CRESA.243  The simple reference to the CRESA in the loan documents 
was deemed sufficient to cause WCA coverage despite the WCA 
exclusion.244  As a result, the advance related back to the priority date of 
the CRESA and was superior to the second lender.245  The WCA does 
expressly provide that a merchant can agree to be covered by the WCA 
when a transaction is not otherwise subject to the WCA.246  Apparently, 
a lender’s agreement can be inferred by the simple use of the CRESA 
loan documents. 
However, Bank of Barron indicates that the opposite can also 
 
235. Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 169 Wis. 2d 437, 447, 485 N.W.2d 426, 428–29 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 447–49. 
239. Id. at 452–53. 
240. Id. at 456. 
241. Id. at 456–57. 
242. Id. at 457. 
243. Id. at 458. 
244. Id. at 457–58. 
245. Id. at 459–61. 
246. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(17) (2011–2012). 
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occur.247  Another advance by the Bank of Barron also exceeded the 
$25,000 cap, but the loan documents evidencing this advance were 
prepared in a different fashion.248  The loan documents for this advance 
specifically provided that it was “not governed by the Wisconsin 
Consumer Act.”249  As a result, the court concluded that the lender did 
not opt into WCA coverage.250  Thus, the advance did not relate back to 
the 1979 CRESA priority date, and as a result, was ruled subordinate to 
the second mortgage holder.251  Obviously, great care should be taken 
when using CRESA forms and non-CRESA forms when documenting 
advances. 
The second exclusion that involves the $25,000 cap is a motor vehicle 
consumer lease where the total lease obligation exceeds $25,000.252  A 
“motor vehicle consumer lease” is a lease entered into in Wisconsin by a 
natural person primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural 
purposes for a period of time exceeding four months.253  In Wehrenberg 
v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., Wehrenberg signed a consumer lease in 
California while she was a Wisconsin resident.254  Wehrenberg argued 
that her lease “was entered into in Wisconsin because she considered 
Wisconsin to be her primary and permanent residence when she signed 
the lease.”255  The court did not agree with her interpretation.256  The 
court reasoned that her “subjective belief that Wisconsin was her 
permanent residence [did] not transform a lease she signed in 
California, on which she listed a California address, into a lease entered 
into in . . . Wisconsin.”257 
Further, the $25,000 cap applies to the “total lease obligation.”258  
The total lease obligation is the sum of all scheduled payments under 
the lease, plus any capitalized costs.259  An illustration of the calculation 
 
247. See Bank of Barron, 169 Wis. 2d at 458–59. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 459. 
251. Id.  
252. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6) (2011–2012). 
253. Id. § 429.104(9); see also discussion supra Part I.B. 
254. Wehrenberg v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., No. 01-0985, 2002 Wisc. App. LEXIS 
24, at *4–5 (Jan. 10, 2002). 
255. Id. at *4. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
258. WIS. STAT. § 429.104(9). 
259. Id. §§ 421.301(43m), 429.104(6) (defining capitalized costs). 
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is provided in Raneda v. Bank of America, N.A.260  In Raneda, a 
customer leased an SUV, and under the terms of the lease the customer 
was required to pay thirty-nine payments of $733.91.261  Upon 
nonpayment by the customer, the car was repossessed, and the customer 
alleged that the repossession action violated the WCA.262  The issue 
before the court was whether the total lease obligation exceeded the 
$25,000 cap.263  The customer argued that the total lease obligation is 
calculated by looking at “the value of the vehicle at the beginning of the 
lease [term] . . . minus the option to purchase at the end of the lease 
[term].”264  Applying that formula, the value of the vehicle would have 
been valued at just under $16,000 and subject to the WCA.265  The court, 
however, disagreed with the customer’s method of calculating the total 
lease obligation.266  Rather, the court concluded that “[a]ccording to the 
WCA, [the] total lease obligation for a motor vehicle consumer lease 
is . . . the sum of all [the] scheduled periodic payments under the lease 
plus the down payment.”267  Under that formula, the total lease 
obligation was $28,622.49.268  As a result, the court concluded that the 
motor vehicle consumer lease was not subject to the WCA.269 
The third exclusion that involves the $25,000 cap is “[any] other 
consumer transaction[]” where the cash price exceeds $25,000.270  An 
interesting issue that the courts have faced is when there are multiple 
debts owed by the consumer, should each debt be considered separately, 
or should the debts be combined and considered as one larger debt for 
cap purposes?  In Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hospital, the debtors owed 
$27,051.65 to the hospital for two hospitalizations.271  The hospital filed a 
 
260. Raneda v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 02-2149, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS 616, at **12–13 
(July 1, 2003). 
261. Id. at **13. 
262. Id. at **12–13. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at **13. 
267. Id.; see also WIS. STAT. §§ 421.301(43m), 429.104(26) (2011–2012) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
268. Raneda, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS 616, at **13. 
269. Id. at **12. 
270. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6). 
271. Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 228 Wis. 2d 425, 447, 597 N.W.2d 462, 474 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
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hospital lien against the Dorrs,272 and the Dorrs claimed that such 
activity was a violation of the WCA.273  The hospital combined the two 
charges into a single charge, which exceeded the $25,000 cap.274  As a 
result, the hospital asserted that the matter fell within the WCA’s 
exclusionary clause.275  Each individual claim was less than $25,000.276  
The issue before the court was whether the claims could be combined 
into a single claim, or whether they should be treated as individual 
claims.277  The court noted that “[t]he evidence before the court was 
insufficient to determine whether the two hospitalizations represent[ed] 
a single transaction or [were distinctly] separate transactions.”278  The 
court noted that “[i]f the [debtors could] demonstrate that the 
hospitalizations [were] separate and independent transactions under the 
[WCA], each claim must be treated independently and both [claims 
would be] under the statutory maximum.”279  Similarly, where multiple 
notes exist between the debtor and creditor, each individual note will be 
considered separate from the other notes and not combined for a total 
debt that could exceed the $25,000 limit.280 
In addition to the multiple claims issue, there is also some 
disagreement over the type of consumer transactions covered by this 
third exclusionary clause.281  For example, the treatment of consumer 
leases for property, other than motor vehicles (which clearly fall within 
the coverage of the second exclusionary clause), has led to conflicting 
results.  In American Industrial Leasing Co. v. Geiger, American 
Industrial leased two tractors to the Geigers for a term of sixty months 
with a monthly payment of $816.31 for a total lease obligation of 
$48,978.60.282  American had purchased the two tractors for $29,050.283  
 
272. Id. at 430. 
273. Id. at 447. 
274. Id. at 447–48. 
275. Id. at 447. 
276. Id. 
277. See id. at 448. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. at 448–49. 
280. Ixonia State Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), 8 B.R. 912, 916–17 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wis. 1981). 
281. Compare discussion infra notes 282–94 and accompanying text, with discussion infra 
notes 295–304 and accompanying text. 
282. Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Geiger, 118 Wis. 2d 140, 142, 345 N.W.2d 527, 528 (Ct. 
App. 1984). 
283. Id. 
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Upon the Geigers’ default, litigation ensued between the parties, and 
the Geigers argued that the WCA exclusions did not apply to consumer 
leases.284  In other words, the Geigers proposed that all consumer leases 
were subject to WCA.285  The court noted that the Geigers’ lease was a 
consumer credit transaction and as such was a consumer transaction 
subject to the WCA.286  The issue, however, was whether the transaction 
was subject to one of the $25,000 exclusionary clauses provided in the 
WCA.287  The Geigers argued that because the first exclusionary rule 
defines amount financed in terms of consumer credit sales and consumer 
loans, and the third exclusionary rule in terms of cash price, the 
legislature must have intended consumer leases not to be included in the 
exclusionary clauses.288  The court, however, disagreed with the Geigers’ 
interpretation of the WCA.289  The court reasoned that the purpose 
behind the $25,000 exclusion is that transactions under $25,000 should 
be given protection under the WCA, but the transactions over $25,000 
will likely involve the assistance of counsel.290  Therefore, the court 
concluded it would be logical to apply the $25,000 exclusion to all 
consumer transactions, including consumer leases.291  The court chose to 
apply the first exclusionary clause and proceeded to determine the 
amount financed under the lease.292  The court reasoned that the amount 
financed is that amount to which an interest rate is charged.293  The court 
held the amount financed was the purchase price by American, or 
$29,050, and as a result, the WCA was not applicable to the 
transaction.294 
A contrary analysis is presented in American Industrial Leasing Co. 
v. Moderow.295  In Moderow, the Moderows agreed to make eighty-four 
lease payments of $619.22 ($52,014.48) to American for a mono-slope 
hog confinement building that was to be placed on the Moderows’ 
 
284. Id. at 144–45. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at 143–44. 
287. Id. at 144. 
288. Id. at 144, 146. 
289. Id. at 146. 
290. See id. at 145. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. at 146. 
293. Id. at 148. 
294. Id. 
295. Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d 64, 432 N.W.2d 617 (Ct. App. 
1988). 
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property.296  American bought the building for $25,100 for the purpose 
of leasing it to the Moderows.297  The “lease provided that [the] title to 
the building would remain with American and . . . the building would be 
returned to American [at the] expiration of the lease [term].”298  The 
lease agreement required the Moderows to pay three monthly payments 
($1,857.66) prior to installing the building on their property.299  The 
initial payment was applied toward satisfaction of the Moderows’ 
obligation.300  Thereafter, when litigation ensued, the Moderows argued 
that the WCA applied to their transaction.301  Specifically, they asserted 
that the transaction was less than $25,000 because the cash price for the 
building ($25,100) less the initial payment ($1,857.66) resulted in a 
$23,242.34 transaction.302  The court, however, concluded that the 
$25,100 figure was the cash price for the building, and the initial 
payment of the three installment payments of the eighty-four month 
agreement was not a “down payment” intended to reduce the purchase 
price.303  Therefore, the cash price exceeded the $25,000 limit of the Act 
and was excluded.304 
The concept of cash price appears in both the first and third 
exclusionary clause.305  In the first exclusionary clause, the concept 
appears in the definition of amount financed, but only with reference to 
consumer credit sales.306  The Moderow court clearly held that the 
consumer lease in Moderow was not a consumer credit sale, and no 
mention was ever made of the lease qualifying as a consumer loan.307  
Therefore, the only exclusionary rule that the Moderow court could 
have been applying that contains the concept of cash price is the third 
exclusionary rule. 
The Moderow and Geiger cases raise two interesting issues.  First, 
 
296. Id. at 65. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 66; see also 1997 Wis. Act 302 (restricting the WCA coverage for agricultural 
transactions such that transactions like the Moderows’ lease are subject to more limited 
requirements under the WCA); WIS. STAT. § 421.202(10) (2011–2012). 
302. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d at 67. 
303. Id. at 69. 
304. Id. 
305. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6). 
306. Id. 
307. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d at 70–71. 
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for consumer leases (other than motor vehicle leases consumer leases 
that are covered by the second exclusionary clause), is the first or third 
exclusionary clause the correct one to apply?  The answer will depend 
upon the subject matter of the consumer lease. 
The first exclusionary clause applies to “[c]onsumer credit 
transactions” in which the amount financed exceeds $25,000.308  
“Consumer credit transaction” is a very broad term309 and specifically 
includes consumer credit sales, consumer loans, consumer leases, and 
transactions pursuant to open-end credit plans.310  A consumer credit 
sale,311 consumer lease,312 and consumer loan313 are three separate and 
distinct types of consumer credit transactions.  They are mutually 
exclusive terms.  In other words, a consumer credit sale is neither a 
consumer lease nor a consumer loan, and vice versa. 
The consumer lease included within the definition of consumer 
credit transaction is a consumer lease of goods, not real property.314  
Therefore, the Geiger transaction, which involved the lease of two 
tractors, is a consumer lease, not a consumer credit sale or a consumer 
loan. 
The Moderow transaction, on the other hand, involved the lease of a 
building to be affixed to the Moderows’ real estate.315  Is the subject 
matter of that lease goods, fixtures, or real property?  If the lease is 
deemed to be a leasehold interest in real property, the WCA will not 
apply.316  The subject matter of the lease is the lease of a building 
separate and apart from any real estate interest.  Thus, the lease is not a 
leasehold interest in real property.  Can the building qualify as a good?  
“A contract for the sale apart from the land of . . . things attached to 
[the] realty and capable of severance without material harm . . . is a 
contract for the sale of goods.”317  In Myhre v. Michigan Silo Co., the 
 
308. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6). 
309. See Anzivino, discussion supra note 15, at 205, 218, 220–21, 236. 
310. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10). 
311. Id. § 421.301(9). 
312. Id. § 421.301(11). 
313. Id. § 421.301(12). 
314. Id. § 421.301(10)–(11). 
315. Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d 64, 65–66, 432 N.W.2d 617, 618 
(Ct. App. 1988). 
316. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.05 (July 2007). 
317. WIS. STAT. § 402.107(2); see also id. § 402.107(1) (noting that section 402.107(1) 
applies only to contracts for the sale of a structure to be removed from the realty and as such, 
contemplates a building that is already affixed to real estate and is to be removed). 
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Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a lender was entitled to remove a 
silo from a farm after the farmer defaulted on his loan because there 
was no material injury to the farm as a result of the removal.318  
Therefore, it appears that the lease of the building is a lease of goods.  
But, a fixture is a good that has become so related to the real estate that 
an interest arises in it under real property law.319  Wisconsin uses three 
tests to determine whether a good affixed to the real estate has become 
a fixture or remains personal property.320  The tests are as follows: “(1) 
[a]ctual physical annexation to the real estate; (2) application or 
adaptation to the use or purpose [of] which the realty is devoted”; and 
(3) whether the person making the annexation intends to make it a 
permanent accession or not.321  The main test is the party’s intent at the 
time of the annexation.322  In the Moderow case, there is no question that 
the parties’ intent was to return the building to the lessor at the end of 
the lease term.323  Therefore, the lease of the building did not involve a 
fixture but a good.  The Moderow lease is a consumer lease, not a 
consumer credit sale or a consumer loan. 
The first exclusionary clause is further qualified by referring to 
consumer credit transactions where the amount financed is greater than 
$25,000.  The amount financed only applies to transactions that are 
either a consumer credit sale or a consumer loan.324  A consumer lease is 
not a consumer credit sale or a consumer loan.  Therefore, consumer 
leases cannot fall within the coverage of the first exclusionary clause, 
contrary to the Geiger court decision, which analyzed the transaction 
under the first exclusionary clause. 
The third exclusionary clause applies to any “other consumer 
transaction[]” where the cash price exceeds $25,000.325  What are these 
other consumer transactions?  On its face, the third exclusionary clause 
appears to be the catch-all clause.  In other words, what is not included 
in the first two clauses is logically included in the third clause.  As noted 
 
318. Myhre v. Mich. Silo Co., 220 Wis. 593, 597, 265 N.W. 703, 705 (1936). 
319. WIS. STAT. § 409.102(k). 
320. Auto Acceptance & Loan Corp. v. Kelm, 18 Wis. 2d 178, 182, 118 N.W.2d 175, 178 
(1962). 
321. Id. 
322. Id. 
323. Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d 64, 65, 432 N.W.2d 617, 618 (Ct. 
App. 1988). 
324. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(5)(a). 
325. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6). 
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above, the first exclusionary clause applies to consumer credit sales and 
consumer loans, and the second exclusionary clause applies to motor 
vehicle consumer leases.  Necessarily, the third exclusionary clause must 
apply to any other consumer transaction that does not fall within the 
first two exclusionary clauses.  Therefore, the third exclusionary clause 
will apply to all consumer leases of goods (other than motor vehicle 
leases) like Geiger and Moderow. 
Second, how should a court calculate the cash price under the third 
exclusionary clause for transactions like Geiger and Moderow?  A 
cursory review of both Geiger and Moderow indicates that there was no 
cash price between the lessor and lessee in either case.326 
The third exclusionary clause excludes other consumer transactions 
where the cash price exceeds $25,000.327  The cash price used by the 
court in both Moderow and Geiger was the price the lessor spent to 
purchase the leased item from some third party.328  But that is not the 
cash price of a lease.  The WCA defines the cash price as the “price at 
which property . . . [is] offered, in the ordinary course of business, for 
sale for cash.”329  The consumer transaction subject to measure under the 
WCA is the lease between the lessor and lessee not the lessor’s prior 
transaction.  The current cash value of any future stream of cash 
payments (the lease payments) is determined by calculating its present 
value.330  For both leases, the “cash value” would be the present value of 
the monthly payments over the term of the lease.  Those are the values 
that should be measured against the $25,000 cap. 
C. The First Lien Real Estate Mortgage Exclusion 
First lien real estate mortgages or their equivalent security interest 
are excluded from WCA coverage.331  The reason for the exclusion is 
that Chapter 428 covers first lien real estate mortgages and their 
equivalent security interest.332  The concept of what constitutes an 
equivalent security interest333 has been subject to some interpretation.  
 
326. See discussion supra notes 282–304 and accompanying text. 
327. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6). 
328. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d at 69; Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Geiger, 118 Wis. 2d 140, 
148, 345 N.W.2d 527, 528-29 (Ct. App. 1984). 
329. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(7). 
330. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004). 
331. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(7). 
332. Id. § 428.101. 
333. Id. 
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For example, in Ott v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc., the Otts purchased 
a time-share ownership interest in a resort in the Wisconsin Dells.334  The 
Otts signed a time-share contract that provided for installment 
payments over eighty-four months, and Peppertree retained title to the 
time-share unit until all payments were made.335  In fact, the Otts did 
make payments for five years before they sought to rescind the time-
share purchase.336  As part of their rescission action, the Otts claimed 
that Peppertree had violated the WCA during the initial sale.337  
Peppertree, on the other hand, argued that the WCA did not apply 
because the land contract qualified as a first lien on real estate and was 
thereby excluded from WCA compliance.338 
There are, of course, two issues that must be proven before the 
exclusion can apply.  First, the exclusion requires that the lien must be 
on real estate.339  Without any analysis, the court held that the sale of a 
time-share interest was real estate.340  Second, the interest must be a first 
lien on real estate.341  On the second issue, the court reasoned that in 
order for a transaction to qualify as a first lien on real estate the 
transaction must involve a loan.342  The Otts argued that Peppertree 
never advanced any monies to them, so, therefore, there was no loan 
involved in the transaction.343  Peppertree acknowledged that it did not 
advance any monies to the Otts but claimed that their “forbearance”344 
on the balance of the purchase price constituted a loan.345  The court 
held that the forbearance by Peppertree on the balance of the monies 
due under the time-share contract did constitute a loan.346  Further, the 
court concluded that the land contract sale of the time-share interest 
was analogous to a first lien real estate mortgage or an equivalent 
 
334. Ott v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc., 2006 WI App 77, ¶ 7, 292 Wis. 2d 173, 716 
N.W.2d 127. 
335. Id. ¶ 31. 
336. Id. ¶ 8. 
337. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. 
338. Id. ¶ 30 & n.13. 
339. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(7) (2011–2012). 
340. Ott, 2006 WI App 77, ¶ 30. 
341. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(7). 
342. See Ott, 2006 WI App 77, ¶¶ 31–35. 
343. Id. ¶ 32. 
344. WIS. STAT. §§ 428.102(4), 421.301(23)(d). 
345. Ott, 2006 WI App 77, ¶ 32. 
346. Id.; see also State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 134–35, 139, 179 N.W.2d 641, 
646, 648 (1970) (holding forbearance on a debt can constitute a loan). 
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security interest.347  As such, the transaction qualified under the WCA 
exclusion.348 
In addition to a land contract sale qualifying as an equivalent 
security interest, a second mortgage also qualifies if there is no 
intervening lien and the mortgagee holds the first mortgage on the 
property as well.349  However, even if there is an intervening lien holder, 
advances made by the first mortgage holder, after the intervening lien 
holder, can relate back to the first mortgage holder’s priority date.350  In 
Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, the debtors purchased real estate pursuant 
to a recorded land contract.351  Coincidentally, the debtors executed and 
recorded a CRESA in favor of the Bank of Barron.352  The purpose of 
the CRESA was to give the Bank a lien on the debtors’ property in the 
event the Bank made future advances to the debtors.353  In fact, the Bank 
did eventually make thirty-six advances to the debtors, of which, five 
advances were outstanding at the time of the Bank’s foreclosure 
action.354  All five advances made by the Bank were made after a second 
mortgage holder recorded an interest in the debtors’ property.355 
Two issues arose with regard to the five advances.  First, did the 
advances have priority over the second mortgage holder since the 
advances were made after the recording of the second mortgage?  The 
court noted that the law in Wisconsin is fairly well settled that if a first 
mortgage holder is contractually obligated to make an advance, the 
advance dates back to the original mortgage recording date and would 
have priority over an intervening second mortgage holder.356  
Conversely, if the future advance made by the first mortgage holder is 
optional and the first mortgage holder has actual knowledge of the 
 
347. Ott, 2006 WI App 77, ¶ 35; see also Milbrandt v. Huber, 149 Wis. 2d 275, 288, 440 
N.W.2d 807, 811 (Ct. App. 1989) (“The relationship between vendor and vendee in a land 
contract is analogous to that of equitable mortgagor and mortgagee.”); WIS. ADMIN. CODE 
DFI-WCA § 1.261 (July 2007) (providing that “[T]he term ‘equivalent security interest’ as 
used in WIS. STAT § 422.202(2)(b) . . . include[s] a seller’s interest under a land contract”). 
348. Ott, 2006 WI App 77, ¶ 35. 
349. DFI-WCA § 1.261. 
350. Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 169 Wis. 2d 437, 464–65, 485 N.W.2d 426, 436 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
351. Id. at 447. 
352. Id. 
353. Id. 
354. Id. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. at 462. 
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intervening second mortgage holder at the time of the advance, the 
second mortgage holder has priority.357  With regard to the first three 
advances made by the Bank, the court concluded that the Bank did not 
have actual knowledge of the existence of the second mortgage holder 
at the time of the advances, and as such, the advances related back to 
the original recording date.358  However, the Bank made the fourth and 
fifth advances with actual knowledge of the second mortgage holder’s 
position.359  Both the fourth and fifth advances were made to renew or 
re-amortize prior notes.360  The court noted that a new note that renews 
an old note assumes the priority position of the old note.361  The court 
held that the fourth advance was subordinate to the second mortgage 
holder because the fourth advance did not relate back to the CRESA 
and it renewed a loan that occurred after the recording of the second 
mortgage.362  With regard to the fifth advance, the court held that even 
though it was made with actual knowledge of the second mortgage 
holder’s position, the fifth advance had priority over the second 
mortgage holder.363  The court reasoned that the fifth advance renewed a 
note issued prior to the second mortgage holder’s recorded position and 
related back to the CRESA recording date despite its actual knowledge 
at the time of the advance.364 
The second issue is why did the first lien real estate exclusion not 
apply since four of the five advances related back to the first mortgage 
recording date?  The first lien real estate mortgage exclusion applies to 
exclude all first lien real estate mortgages notwithstanding the amount 
of the loan.365  However, the WCA does provide that a merchant can 
agree to be subject to it.366  As a result, the court reasoned that the 
lender implicitly agreed to be subject to the WCA because the 
documentation that evidenced the four advances367 specifically 
 
357. Id. at 462–63; see also Colonial Bank v. Marine Bank, N.A., 152 Wis. 2d 444, 447, 
448 N.W.2d 659, 660 (1989). 
358. Bank of Barron, 169 Wis. 2d at 463. 
359. Id. 
360. Id. at 459, 464. 
361. Id. at 464. 
362. Id. at 459. 
363. Id. at 464. 
364. Id. 
365. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(7) (2011–2012). 
366. Id. § 421.301(17). 
367. Bank of Barron, 169 Wis. at 460 (noting that the $68,000 advance (third advance) 
did not reference the CRESA but was given priority because by paying off the land contract 
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referenced the prior CRESA loans.368 
III. CONCLUSION 
The WCA applies to consumer credit transactions.369  The three most 
common types of consumer credit transactions are consumer credit 
sales, consumer leases, and open-end credit plans.370  It is important to 
distinguish between these three different types of consumer credit 
transactions because different parts of the WCA will apply to a 
transaction depending upon its classification. 
A true lease or bailment is not a consumer credit sale.371  But a 
disguised lease or bailment is a consumer credit sale.372  A true lease or 
bailment is distinguished from a disguised one by determining whether 
the lessee or bailee can become the owner of the leased or bailed item 
for no additional or nominal consideration.373  Wisconsin uses four tests 
to determine whether a consideration is nominal.374  However, the WCA 
did not provide for those leases or bailments where the consideration is 
not nominal, yet the transaction is a disguised lease or bailment.  For 
those situations, Wisconsin courts should use the economic realities test 
to determine whether the transaction is a true lease or bailment, or a 
disguised consumer credit sale. 
For consumer leases, there are a number of issues.  The primary 
issue, however, is whether the lease is a consumer lease or a commercial 
lease.  Commercial leases are not subject to the WCA.375  The courts 
 
the advance became subrogated to the land contract recording date that was prior to the 
second mortgage holder). 
368. Id. at 458. 
369. WIS. STAT. § 421.201. 
370. Id. § 421.301(10). 
371. See id. § 421.301(9) (omitting true lease or bailment from the definition of 
“[c]onsumer credit sale”). 
372. See id. § 421.102(1)–(2) (explaining that the provisions and definitions of the WCA 
should be construed broadly and liberally so as to comport with the underlying purpose of 
protecting consumers); see also LeBakken Rent-To-Own v. Warnell, 223 Wis. 2d 582, 592–93, 
589 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the WCA shall be read liberally “to 
promote the underlying purposes of the Act and [to] look[] beyond the transaction’s form to 
its substance,” and accordingly to include disguised leases). 
373. See Am. Indus. Leasing Co. v. Moderow, 147 Wis. 2d 64, 70, 432 N.W.2d 617, 619 
(Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the bailment agreement at issue created a lease agreement 
rather than a consumer credit sale because there was no option to purchase). 
374. Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 770 (E.D. Wis. 1996). 
375. Id. at 768 (explaining that while the UCC was intended to cover complex 
commercial transactions like commercial leases, the WCA was not intended to cover complex 
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have developed an objective test that involves considering many factors 
in deciding the proper classification for a lease.376 
Open-end credit plans are subject to the most disclosures under the 
WCA.377  An ordinary credit transaction also has disclosure 
requirements, but they are significantly less than an open-end credit 
plan.378  A cash transaction, on the other hand, has no disclosure 
requirements even if the debtor does not make the cash payment as 
agreed, and a credit relationship ensues.379  The courts have developed a 
number of tests for distinguishing the open-end credit plan from the 
ordinary credit transaction, and for distinguishing the cash transaction, 
which is not subject to the WCA disclosure requirements, from the two 
credit transactions.380 
The article also dealt with the two most common exclusions under 
the WCA–consumer transactions that exceed $25,000 and the first lien 
real estate mortgage.  There are actually three different transactions 
that fall under the $25,000 exclusion: (1) consumer credit transactions 
where the amount financed exceeds $25,000;381 (2) motor vehicle 
consumer leases where the total lease obligation exceeds $25,000;382 and 
(3) any other consumer transaction where the cash price exceeds 
$25,000.383  Each exclusion has its own unique legal issues.  For example, 
multiple loans or advances between parties are generally analyzed as 
individual advances, not one total transaction, when applying the 
$25,000 cap.384  Despite the $25,000 cap, however, advances that exceed 
$25,000 can be covered by WCA depending upon the language used in 
the documents evidencing the transaction.385  Also, the calculation of 
cash price has perplexed the courts, and a proposal is offered to assist in 
 
commercial transactions, but instead was meant to cover transactions involving “the average 
consumer”). 
376. See Duston v. Badger Lease, No. 93-1402, 1994 Wisc. App. LEXIS 202, at *4–6 
(Feb. 22, 1994) (discussing considerations taken into account by the trial court). 
377. Compare WIS. STAT. § 422.308, with WIS. STAT. § 422.302. 
378. WIS. STAT. § 422.302. 
379. See discussion supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.  
380. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
381. WIS. STAT. § 421.202(6). 
382. Id. 
383. Id. 
384. Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 228 Wis. 2d 425, 448, 597 N.W.2d 462, 474 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
385. See Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 169 Wis. 2d 437, 457, 485 N.W.2d 426, 433 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
34306-m
qt_97-1 S
heet N
o. 50 S
ide B
      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 50 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
ANZIVINO 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013  1:57 PM 
92 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
that calculation. 
Finally, the first lien real estate mortgages exclusion was analyzed.386  
Those interests that qualify as equivalent security interests were 
identified.387  Also, guidelines were provided for analyzing the priority 
dispute between a first lien holder and a second lien holder when the 
first lien holder makes future advances after the second lien holder is of 
record.388 
 
386. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
387. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
388. See discussion supra notes 356–57 and accompanying text. 
